The ups and downs of the dollar - consequences of the changes in the monetary regime? by Scheide, Joachim
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Scheide, Joachim
Working Paper
The ups and downs of the dollar -
consequences of the changes in the
monetary regime?
Kiel Working Papers, No. 284
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Scheide, Joachim (1987) : The ups and downs of the dollar -
consequences of the changes in the monetary regime?, Kiel Working Papers, No. 284, http://
hdl.handle.net/10419/1096Kieler Arbeitspapiere
Kiel Working Papers
Working Paper No. 284
The Ups and Downs of the Dollar





Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel
ISSN 0342-0787Institut fur Weltwirtschaft, Kiel
Dusternbrooker Weg 120, D-2300 Kiel
Working Paper No. 284
The Ups and Downs of the Dollar







The author himself, not the Kiel Institute of World
Economics, is solely responsible for the contents
and distribution of each Kiel Working Paper.
Since the series involves manuscripts in a preliminary
form, interested readers are requested to direct
criticisms and suggestions directly to the author
and to clear any quotations with him.
ISSN 0342-0787CONTENTS
I. Introduction
II. Trends and Short-run Fluctuations of the Exchange Rate -*
What Can Be Explained?
III. Can the Trend of the Exchange Rate Be Explained by
Balances on the Current Account or by Budget Deficits?
IV. The Exchange Rate as the Relative Price Between Two Monies
V. The Regime of Monetary Policy and the Role of Expectations
VI. On the Compatibility with the Monetary Approach
VII. The Consequences...
...For a Forecast of the Exchange Rate...




Graph 1: The Dollar-DMark Exchange Rate
Graph 2: Current Account Balances and the Exchange Rate
Graph 3: Budget Balances and the Exchange Rate
Graph 4: US-Monetary Policy and the Dollar: The Three Phases of
Devaluation
Graph 5: The Parallel Movement of the Exchange Rate and the
Inflation DifferentialThe Ups and Downs of the Dollar - Consequences of the Changes in
the Monetary Regime?*
I. Introduction
In the past 15 years, there have been spectacular changes of the
Dollar-DMark exchange rate: Between early 1971 and mid-1973, the
Dollar dropped from DM 3.60 to DM 2.35; between mid-1976 and the
end of 1979, it declined from DM 2.55 to DM 1.75; this was fol-
lowed by the strong rise to DM 3.30 in early 1985 and finally, by
the sharp fall to DM 1.80. Similar movements could be observed
for the Dollar vis-a"-vis other currencies. Large changes like
these have severe consequences for the respective economies,
especially for those sectors which heavily depend on foreign
trade, but also for international investors. It is therefore
hardly surprising that economic policy tries to dampen these
fluctuations and, in doing so, sometimes follows a course that
was not intended originally.
The consequences for economic policy naturally also depend on the
judgment on the causes for exchange rate movements; in this re-
spect, the opinions differ substantially among economists and
other observers. In the following sections, we will discuss - in
a non-technical manner - the widely held views on the relation-
ship between the exchange rate and the current account and the
government budget, respectively. We will then analyze a less
common hypothesis which claims that exchange rate changes in
trend are caused by permanent changes of monetary policy.
II. Trends and Short-run Fluctuations of the Exchange Rate - What
Can Be Explained?
The Dollar-DMark rate shows marked changes in trend since 1971
(Graph 1) ; however, obvious cyclical fluctuations seem to be
Based on the paper "Anstieg und Fall des Dollarkurses - Fol-
gen der amerikanischen Geldpolitik?". Kiel Discussion Papers,
131, April 1987.- 2 -
absent. It would therefore, on the basis of past observations, be
impossible to predict the movement of the exchange rate in the
next period; in other words, the best forecast would be that the
exchange rate will be the same as in the current period (1).
Monthly changes of the Dollar-DMark rate neither exhibit obvious
cycles nor do they seem to be negatively autocorrelated (2) . This
does not mean that short-run movements cannot be explained. The
hypothesis of efficient markets implies that exchange rates only
change if shocks occur, for example, if there are unexpected
changes of monetary policy. According to this hypothesis, at any
point in time every information is already discounted for in
current prices. If we wanted to explain changes in these prices -
ex post -, we would need a model to estimate expected values for
the relevant variables. We would assume rational expectations,
which are compatible with the efficient market hypothesis (i.e.
we would exclude systematic forecast errors). The residuals of
the respective equation can be used as a measure of the shock,
the unpredictable new information. The role of "news" has been
extensively analyzed in the literature, and it has been shown
that only shocks can explain short-run changes of exchange ra-
tes (3) .
(1) .This is the hypothesis of the "random walk" which applies to
prices of other financial assets as well. Actually, to test a
random walk model, one should use all possible observations,
i.e. "from one minute to the next", because daily or monthly
averages commonly published are not observations in the
literal sense.
(2) There seems to be a positive first-order autocorrelation for
the subperiod 1974 to 1976. This "failure" of the random walk
hypothesis can be explained by, for example, interventions by
central banks (other reasons are given in Mussa [1979]). The
first differences of a random walk time series are a purely
stochastic process, whereas for the original random walk
series, the mean and variance are time dependent (e.g. they
can show a "drift").
(3) See, for example, Frenkel [1981] or, in general, the litera-
ture on efficient markets.- 3 -














(a) Monthly averages of the spot exchange rate and absolute changes over the
previous month.- 4 -
The graph also shows that the variance of monthly changes has
been extremely high between the beginning of 1973 and mid-1975
and also for the time since 1980. This means that there has been
a large number of shocks during these periods. In fact, monetary
policy in the US as well as in West Germany was quite hectic.
Additionally, after the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system in
1973, there was probably some need for long overdue adjustment of
exchange rates; and finally, the US and the German central bank
reacted with a different lag and rigor to the surge in inflation
and the oil-price hike in 1973/74. In the eighties, monetary
policy has been extremely unstable in the US. Additionally, there
have been substantial changes in fiscal policy: Taxes were cut,
the budget deficit soared, and there was a continued discussion
about future budget policies which created uncertainty. During
the same period, we could observe real shocks as well (for examp-
le, when raw material prices plunged). All these factors may ex-
plain why the variance of exchange rate changes in these periods
was high relative to the period 1976 to 1979 when there were
hardly any major real shocks and when monetary policy in both
countries was expansionary but not really unstable.
In the following analysis, however, we do not want to focus on
short-term fluctuations (1) but rather on the trends of the Dol-
lar-DMark rate. Since 1971, there have been five phases with a
different trend: The fall until 1973, the stability (in trend)
until 1976, the devaluation up to 1980, the surge up to the be-
ginning of 1985, and the drastic fall since then (2). First, we
want to discuss whether these trends can be reconciled with the
more popular views on exchange rates.
(1) That is, we do not discuss a model which explicitly deals
with short-run expectations.
(2) All the changes in trend mentioned have, in general, been so
substantial as to also reflect real changes of the exchange
rate. In the following analysis, we therefore do not always
discriminate explicitly between nominal and real exchange
rates.- 5 • -
III. Can the Trend of the Exchange Rate Be Explained by
Balances on the Current Account or by Budget Deficits?
Common hypotheses are that sustained changes of the exchange rate
are the result of changes either in the balance on the current
account or in budget deficits. The argument is, first, that a
current account surplus (deficit) implies an excess supply of
foreign (home) currency which leads to a revaluation (devalua-
tion) of the home currency. The second case suggests that a defi-
cit (surplus) in the government budget leads to an increase (de-
crease) in the demand for savings; consequently, interest rates
should rise (fall) and thus the home currency should revalue
(devalue) vis-a-vis other currencies.
As far as the relationship between the current account and the
exchange rate (current account hypothesis) is concerned, the
development during the first part of the eighties is completely
at variance with this hypothesis: The rise in the US-deficit was
not combined with a devaluation but rather a revaluation of the
Dollar (Graph 2) . Also, the surge in the German current account
surplus until 1985 did not cause the DMark to revalue, as the
hypothesis suggests, but the DMark fell vis-a-vis the Dollar.
Also in the seventies, we could not generally observe the postu-
lated parallel movement; the actual development was almost com-
pletely opposite to what could have been expected from the hypo-
thesis (1) .
There is obviously no influence from the current account on the
exchange rate; in fact, the causality seems to run the other way.
This seems to be plausible, since the exchange rate affects the
(1) The effective rather than the bilateral exchange rate is
probably more relevant for the total balance on current
account. But even if this indicator is used instead, the
hypothesis cannot be supported (see Graph Al in the
Appendix).- 6 -
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(a) Balance of the current account as percent of GNP.- 7 -
international competitiveness of a country and thus - among other
factors - trade flows. What then determines the exchange rate?
The capital balance is the counterpart of the balance on current
account, and it can be argued that changes in capital flows are
responsible for exchange rate movements. If there is capital
mobility, internationally oriented investors will invest their
money in that country which promises the highest rentability in
the future.
There is much reason to believe that in the beginning of the.
eighties, the US were viewed as relatively attractive: First, the
growth prospects in Western Europe - and also in Japan - were
poor compared to the seventies; and second, many developing coun-
tries, normally natural candidates for foreign investment, faced
tremendous debt problems or were at the brink of a crisis. In
this surrounding, the prospects for the US were relatively good:
The changes in tax policies raised the rentability of investment
and thus promised more growth in the medium run; at the same
time, monetary policy was directed at the target of price level
stability. Therefore, the US seemed very attractive at this parti-
cular time (1) ; in fact, there was a - relative to other indus-
trial countries - strong recovery in 1983/84, and the inflation
rate fell substantially. It seems obvious that investment de-
cisions were affected by these developments, they led to a turn-
around of international capital flows (2) . The US exported less
and imported more capital, and simultaneously the value of the
Dollar rose sharply. The deficit in the current account was just
the other side of the coin. Investors were obviously willing to
invest their money in the US in spite of the rising Dollar; in
this sense, the financing of the deficit was obviously no problem
(3) .
(1) See Giersch [1985] on these points.
(2) This turnaround must not necessarily be taken literally. What
seems important are the shifts of supply and demand curves
causing a change in the price (in this case: a revaluation of
the Dollar).
(3) Of course, it is never a problem, a deficit is always volun-
tarily financed. What seems important is the price at which
this financing takes place.- 8 -
While it is true that the deficit in the current account was
combined with a revaluation of the Dollar, the current account
hypothesis need not be wrong or should not necessarily be re-
versed. It just seems it is not complete. For several cases in
the recent past, this hypothesis seems to do well enough. In the
seventies, we could observe major devaluations of the Italian
Lira, the British Pound and the French Franc which were indeed
combined with high and even rising deficits in the current ac-
count. The same applies to the French Franc at the beginning of
the eighties, when the French government pursued an expansionary
policy. But also with respect to these cases, it can be said that
the movements of exchange rates were induced by changes in the
capital flows: Apparently, these policy moves were interpreted as
being simply demand oriented - monetary policy also was expansio-
nary - and were thus viewed as, short-sighted and unsound (1) .
International investors withdrew their money from these coun-
tries, the deficit in the capital balance increased which implied
a higher current account deficit.
The other hypothesis (2) suggests a positive correlation between
budget deficits and the exchange rate (budget hypothesis). This
relationship was obviously valid at the beginning of the eigh-
ties: After 1979 - and especially after 1981 - the US government
deficit increased substantially and the Dollar revalued after
1980 (Graph 3). The fact that at the same time the German deficit
declined is also compatible with the hypothesis. However, the
drastic fall of the Dollar since early 1985 cannot be explained,
since the deficit remained high and declined only marginally in
1986. For the hypothesis to be valid, one would have to argue
that investors now expect a sharp fall of the deficit because of,
for example, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. However, this expec-
(1) See Gebert, Scheide [1980].
(2) This hypothesis is put forward by, for example, Feldstein
[1984]. It also seems to be the most controversial one, be-
cause the differences in the judgments can hardly be greater.
The hypothesis is questioned, among others, by Brunner [1986]
and Evans [1986], Of course, we do not intend to solve the
apparent contradiction between schools; obviously, it cannot
even be settled empirically (but that is the state of the art
in economics anyway!).- 9 -









(a) Balance of the (federal government) budget as percent of GNP.- 10 -
tation does obviously not dominate in the US right now; most
forecasters assume that the deficit will remain high or will fall
only slightly. But apart from this, the hypothesis can also not
be fully supported by observations in the seventies: Though the
deficit changed only slightly between 1971 and 1973, the Dollar
fell sharply; the following increase in the deficit did not lead
to a revaluation of the Dollar, and finally, from 1976 until
1979, the deficit both in the US and West Germany declined, but
the Dollar depreciated substantially (1).
With regard to budget deficits, too, it seems to be important how
international investors judge the underlying policies. Just as
with the deficit in the current account, it is not the fact that
the budget deficit per se increases. If that was important, Ita-
ly, the UK and France should have had strong currencies in the
seventies (2) since the budget hypothesis implies that the in-
crease in the demand for credit by the government should raise
interest rates and, consequently, the exchange rate. However, the
policy of "deficit spending" in these countries was obviously not
viewed as a way to promote growth in the medium run. Their poli-
cies did not attract but rather deterred international capital,
and their currencies devalued. Investors were willing to finance
the increasing government debt only at a lower exchange rate. In
this respect, as has been mentioned above, the American policy of
the early eighties was interpreted much more positively. Although
it implied an increase in the budget deficit, it did not seem to
be unsound, possibly also because some measures promised to
foster medium-term growth. However, it has to be explained why
such a judgment, if it had indeed prevailed, changed abruptly in
the course of 1985 and 1986 (more on this hypothesis in Chapter
V) .
(1) The relationship is not any closer if effective exchange
rates are used (see Graph A2 in the Appendix).
(2) The same applies to the French experiment of the early
eighties.- 11 -
The discussion suggests that changes in the flows alone - whether
in the current account or in budget savings - cannot satisfacto-
rily explain fluctuations or trends of exchange rates. What seems
important is the type of policy underlying these changes and how
this affects the judgment and the expectations of international
investors. In the next two chapters, we will spell out criteria
which seem to be important for the decisions of investors.
IV. The Exchange Rate as the Relative Price Between Two Monies
In the past ten years, many economists have favored the monetary
approach (1) which stresses the importance of changes in monetary
policy for exchange rate changes. The statement that the exchange
rate is the relative price between two monies is, however, as
trivial as it is misleading. To be sure, the exchange rate can
only be defined this way; but it would be wrong to conclude that
all one has to do is look at the published money supply data of
any two countries to get a complete explanation for the exchange
rate. It would indeed be too simple if one could explain share or
bond prices by just analyzing the respective supply figures. To
explain prices at financial markets, it is not sufficient to know
the volume or change of supply (money supply, volume of shares,
stock' of government bonds outstanding); instead, expectations
with respect to future yields of the various wealth components
play a key role. Thus apart from the supply side, the demand
aspect needs consideration; and the demand for money, for ex-
ample, is influenced by expectations which in turn reflect inter-
pretations of the changes in supply. The problem is, of course,
that expectations cannot be observed or be trivially derived
from money supply data.
Current changes in monetary expansion can possibly explain ex-
change rate movements in the very short tun. According to the
theory of "overshooting", a currency depreciates when monetary
(1) For this approach, see, for example, Frenkel [1976].- 12 -
policy at home becomes more expansionary; this is roughly equi-
valent to the liquidity effect of monetary policy applied to the
open economy (1) . The fact that the relative movement of the
money supplies in any two countries cannot account for all major
changes in exchange rates has led to some reservation against the
monetary approach. However, it has to be taken into account that,
for example, the velocity of money in the US and in West Germany
has always behaved quite differently. As an example for the
seventies: Although the trend growth of Ml in the US was lower
than in West Germany, the US inflation rate was substantially
higher.
Some criticism seems to be justified anyway, since the monetary
approach - in its usual form - cannot explain why real exchange
rates move so much over the medium run (2) . The theory implies
that nominal exchange rates more or less behave in such a way as
to compensate movements of the respective price levels (3). How-
(1) The "overshooting"-thesis rests on the assumption of differ-
ent adjustment speeds for different markets; financial mar-
kets respond relatively fast, so the adjustment after a chan-
ge in monetary policy starts here. An expansionary policy
leads to a higher demand for bonds; consequently, interest
rates fall and the interest differential vis-a-vis foreign
countries declines. This implies that the forward market
expects a revaluation of the home currency for the respective
period (say, a year). However, since the currency should de-
value compared to the value before the change in monetary
policy, the devaluation must be immediate and larger than
necessary in the medium run. This exchange rate change is a
real change because goods markets - by assumption - do react
only later. When the process has worked itself through the
system, the exchange rate has returned to the path given the
purchasing power parity, i.e. in the longer run, real ex-
change rates do not change. On this theory, see Dornbusch
[1976].
(2) See, for example, Furstenberg [1985] on this point. The theo-
rem of purchasing power parity is nothing but the corollary
to the quantity theory, also in the sense that changes in
monetary policy have no effect on real variables - including
the real exchange rate - in the long run.
(3) Real exchange changes can, of course, also be explained by
the monetary approach, for example, in the case of differen-
tials in real income changes in two countries. However, the
size of the respective elasticities in the money demand func-
tion does not seem to be sufficient to explain real movements
of the magnitude we could observe in recent years.Bibliothek
- 13 - des Institute fur Weltwirtschdt
ever, in the seventies, the Dollar devalued vis-a-vis the DMark
by 40 p.c. in real terms, and it revalued by no less than 100
p.c. at the beginning of the eighties. Movements of a similar
magnitude could be observed for the effective rate of the Dollar.
V. The Regime of Monetary Policy and the Role of Expectations
In the past, large and persistent changes in real exchange rates
could be observed for countries with high inflation rates or even
hyperinflations; capital flight has been a major characteristic
in recent years for countries with debt problems. Do internatio-
nal investors react in a similar manner if inflation is only
moderate?
The decision to invest capital in a country very much depends on
the relative "stability" in the particular country. This stabili-
ty may mean different things to the investor: Are there high
profit opportunities for real investment projects? Is taxation of
capital low? Is the probability of expropriation low? Are markets
free of government regulations and interventions? Or quite gene-
rally, does economic policy follow a course which promises a
stable economic development in the longer run? - It is certainly
important to the investor that the supply side is relatively
dynamic or that policy measures are market-oriented; but it is
probably also highly important whether the price level is expec-
ted to be fairly stable in the medium run. Or in.other words: A
policy which allows for inflation or even deliberately accepts
inflation to achieve certain goals will be considered as less
attractive by investors. High inflation is often viewed as an
indication of an unsound policy pursued to overcome problems on
the real side of the economy (high unemployment, structural prob-
lems etc.) "by a trick"; it is possibly incompatible with a mar-
ket-oriented policy. As an example, several of those LDCs now
considered problem countries with respect to their foreign debt
have taken recourse to inflationary policies to finance exorbi-
tant budget deficits or to reduce adjustment problems on labor-- 14 -
or goods markets. Given these considerations, international
investors will watch carefully whether a country will allow for
more inflation. However, this cannot always be derived from
current monetary policy; one or two quarters of higher monetary
expansion compared to the previous course do not necessarily
induce changes in the judgment for the medium run. Expectations
are influenced by what can be called the monetary regime, i.e.
the type of policy pursued and the priorities of monetary policy
(the targets for monetary policy may very well change over time).
The meaning of the monetary regime and its importance can be
demonstrated for past movements of the exchange rate. At the
beginning and in the second half of the seventies, US monetary
policy became very expansionary (Graph 4). Obviously, the regime
in these two periods was similar. Under President Nixon (Phase
I) , monetary policy tried to stimulate the economy. The real
effects of this policy were supposed to be increased by price-
and wage controls (which later had to be abolished) . This stra-
tegy raised inflationary expectations, the Dollar declined mar-
kedly, and we could observe a substantial acceleration of infla-
tion in 1973/74 (1) . A similarly expansionary policy was pursued
under President Carter since 1976 (Phase II). At that time, mone-
tary expansion accelerated, also in response to the locomotive-
strategy propagated at that time. The consequences were the same
as in Phase I: The Dollar depreciated (2), and inflation started
to accelerate markedly in 1978 (3). These two episodes represent
the Keynesian experiment of the seventies, and the same type of
policy was pursued in other countries as well, among them - as
already mentioned - were Italy, France and the UK (4).
(1) The increase of oil prices added to the increase of infla-
tion.
(2) At that time, the US-Administration, especially Michael Blu-
menthal, pursued the policy of "talking the Dollar down". It
could be "successful" because monetary policy was expansio-
nary enough.
(3) Again, inflation was pushed up further by the increase in oil
prices.
(4) The same applies to the French experiment in the early
eighties.Graph 4: US-Monetary Policy and the Dollar: The Three Phases of Devaluation
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This hypothesis which stresses the change of the regime is also
compatible with the Dollar's surge in the early eighties. The
change in the US-Administration in 1981 implied a fundamental
shift of priorities. Apart from other measures (in the area of
stimulating profitability) , the determination of fighting infla-
tion which had reached double-digit rates was a major charac-
teristic of the new policy. In this respect, the central bank was
highly successful because inflation dropped to 3.5 p.c. in 1985.
Consequently, the US became attractive again for international
investors. Currency substitution was at work, the US appeared to
be a safe haven again.
Since the beginning of 1985, however, economic policy has changed
again. Not only has monetary expansion accelerated substantially;
also the targets and the reasoning by both the government and the
central bank seemed to be different from the period before (1) .
While the target of price level stability had dominated during
previous years and while the high Dollar had not been considered
as any problem - actually, it had been viewed as supporting the
US policy -, the prime concern now was stimulating the real eco-
nomy. Fiscal policy could not contribute much in this respect,
since the budget deficit was already high. So monetary policy was
singled out as the main instrument to tackle the real problems
which began to come to the surface again after the recovery had
lost steam (the farm crisis, the problems of smokestack indu-
stries, the difficulties of the banking industry etc.). Also, the
policy was seen as a way to stimulate exports by reducing the
value of the Dollar. This was done verbally - the Blumenthal-
Dollar of the late seventies thus finds its parallel in the Ba-
ker-Dollar - and by international cooperation (the Plaza meeting
of September 1985) ; this strategy was "successful" because the
Fed was ready (although maybe not always willing?) to accommodate
this by an expansionary policy. In addition to the change in
monetary policy, there was also a shift in fiscal policy. The
priority was no longer to stimulate investment; and it seems
(1) For a discussion, see Scheide [1986b],- 17 -
that the judgment on the US budget deficit also changed since
there were only few observers who believed - contrary to earlier
expectations - that the budget deficit could be substantially
reduced by expenditure cuts.
So one is tempted to say that the new policy since 1985 repre-
sents a shift in the regime, even if the period of accelerated
monetary expansion has so far "only" lasted for two years (while
in Phase I and Phase II, the acceleration lasted longer). One
important indication that a shift really occurred is the fact
that the Dollar depreciated right after the change of monetary
policy in 1985. It therefore seems that the rhetoric and the
policy on the one hand and the reactions of international in-
vestors on the other are the same as in the two phases in the
seventies when the Dollar also declined (it should be stressed
here that this hypothesis does not claim quantitative precision -
it rather is a pattern that can be detected; in other words, the
hypothesis does not depend on the fact that the Dollar declined
to DM 1.80 instead of "only" DM 2.30).
The hypothesis emphasizes the relevance of the interpretation of
a policy as opposed to the actual policy (although, of course,
they cannot differ over a longer period). In this respect, we can
argue that the development over the past two years has been dif-
ferent from the period between mid-1982 and early 1983, when
monetary expansion also accelerated substantially (1) . At that
time, several economists predicted more inflation because of the
policy change (2). However, it appears that market participants
at that time did not expect a permanent shift away from the re-
strictive stance of monetary policy; in spite of higher monetary
expansion, the Dollar did not decline. The expectation that the
expansionary policy was only a short episode proved to be correct
(3) because the central bank became restrictive again in the
(1) It is certainly true that this period remains to be a puzzle
for monetarists because of - among other things - the unusual
behavior of velocity.
(2) For example, Friedman [1983].
(3) Of course, this does not mean that expectations are always
correct.- 18 -
spring of 1983. In other words: During that period, the regime of
monetary policy had not yet changed, price level stability was
obviously still the prime concern for monetary policy (1). How-
ever, it seems that today the situation is different.
So far we have mentioned similarities to Phases I and II in the
seventies; however, the development of Phase III is not yet fully
in accordance because the US inflation rate has not picked up.
Therefore, we may still hesitate to say that investors did indeed
react to a change towards an inflationary regime. But it is not
unusual that there is a lag between monetary policy and infla-
tion. In the sixties and seventies, this lag averaged roughly two
years. There were first signs of a higher rate of inflation (mea-
sured in terms of the CPI) in late 1985. However, this tendency
was interrupted in 1986 when oil prices plunged; this led even to
a further decrease of the inflation rate which averaged 2 p.c. in
1986. When this effect subsided, prices started to rise faster;
between mid-1986 and the beginning of 1987, the CPI increased by
about 4.5 p.c. (annual rate). It is likely that the US will from
now on experience higher inflation rates again (2).
If the regime and the derived expectations are important for the
exchange rate, we should observe a close relationship between the
exchange rate and inflation rates. In the case of the Dollar-
DMark rate, this hypothesis can be demonstrated relatively well;
(1) The 1982/83-episode, though it cannot be fully explained, may
serve as a good example for the relevance of the inflationary
effects of monetary policy as opposed to transitory increases
of monetary, expansion. This distinction seems important;
otherwise we could really say that we have found a - close to
- mechanistic relationship between monetary expansion and the
exchange rate. According to our hypothesis, the Dollar did
not decline because inflation did not accelerate. Another way
of interpreting this period is that the monetary expansion
just happened to accommodate the increase of desired real
balances induced by the sharp fall of the inflation rate.
(2) In the past, doubts have been raised whether Ml was still a
reliable indicator for monetary policy. The Fed even decided
not to announce targets for Ml anymore. It may be true that
the relationship between Ml and economic activity has become
somewhat looser recently; nevertheless, Ml still seems to be
reliable as an indicator for the direction of policy. Apart
from this, other aggregates, too, indicate that monetary











(a) Difference between the US and West German inflation rate (percentage change of the CPI over previous year).- 20 -
since the early seventies, there has been a parallel movement
between the exchange rate and the difference between the US and
the West German inflation rate (Graph 5) . There are, indeed,
major aberrations (1), but the trend of both variables seems to
be much the same. Thus we can reconcile the major movements of
the Dollar with our hypothesis: The fall until the end of 1973,
the stability until 1976, the fall between 1977 and 1980, the
rise until the beginning of 1985, and finally - should the infla-
tion rate in the US rise faster than in West Germany (2) - the
fall since then. It should be clear that the relationship is more
like a pattern (a relationship between trends) rather than a
close quantitative relationship (although a regression may reveal
"satisfactory" results!).
VI. On the Compatibility with the Monetary Approach
Our approach which stresses the differences of inflation per-
formance is quite compatible with an extended version of the
monetary approach. The monetary regime influences the expecta-
tions of investors. If more inflation is expected for the US
because of money supply data and the priorities of the authori-
ties (justifications by the central bank, rhetoric of the go-
vernment etc.), the demand for US-Dollars declines. International
(1) This was especially so in 1984/85, when the Dollar surged
again for a short period.
(2) The effect of what happens in the US seems to dominate with
respect to the trend of the exchange rate. How can it be that
we can practically leave out West Germany's monetary policy?
How come that we get these effects on the exchange rate al-
though the German Bundesbank has always more or less followed
the course of the Fed? Two tentative answers can be offered:
First, Germany's policy is probably viewed as being more
stability-oriented than the US policy; in fact, over the past
15 years, inflation rates have been lower an average and have
never reached double-digit figures like in the US. Therefore,
deviations from a stability-oriented course are more impor-
tant for the exchange rate if they occur in the US. Second,
the relative size of the two countries matters; the reaction
towards a shift in the larger country may have a larger ef-
fect on the exchange rate than a shift in the smaller coun-
try.- 21 -
investors will restructure their portfolios and the share of US
currency will be reduced (1). This currency substitution implies
that money demand falls not in proportion with the increase of
inflation but by more than that, whereas that currency which
inflates less will in turn receive a "stability premium" (2).
Investors will tend to avoid the inflating currency also because
the risk connected with the expected yield increases. One reason
is that - as past experience shows - the variance of inflation
rates increases with the average inflation rate. This means that
the risk with respect to, for example, the price of a Dollar
denominated bond (the interest rate risk) increases if the US
inflation rate rises. According to our hypothesis, the expecta-
tions of investors which are influenced by the regime of monetary
policy are the crucial element in determining the demand for a
particular currency. The inflation rate which will result from
this whole process can be viewed as the outcome of the interplay
between the demand for and the supply of money. In this non-
trivial sense, the exchange rate can be interpreted as the rela-
tive price between two monies.
(1) Compare the analysis in Fiirstenberg [1985].- It is important
to analyze how quickly expectations can change and what de-
termines the process of forming expectations. One way of
discriminating between permanent and only transitory changes
is modelled by Brunner, Cukierman, Meltzer [1983].
(2) Another argument can be derived from a simple example: Let us
assume that there are only bonds in the US and West Germany
with a time to maturity of 10 years. An increase of the US
interest rate by one percentage point - because of a rise in
expected inflation by 1 p.c. - will reduce the price of the
bond by 7 percentage points. If we assume efficient markets
(all expected returns are equal), the exchange rate immedia-
tely has to decline by 6 p.c; this is the consequence of the
relationship with the forward rate. Now the assumption that
only bonds are traded is, of course, unrealistic. The average
time to maturity is somewhat shorter, and also goods markets
may compensate some of the changes in the exchange rate.
However, this simple.example demonstrates that even a small
change of inflationary expectations can have a large effect
on the exchange rate.- 22 -
VII. The Consequences...
The dramatic exchange rate movements do not seem to contradict
the assumption of rational behavior on the part of economic
agents (1) . The hypothesis that has been put forward here and
which stresses the importance of the regime and inflationary
expectations can be falsified. It would, for example, be an appa-
rent, contradiction if the Dollar rose sharply from now on while,
at the same time, the US inflation rate accelerated substantially
compared to West Germany's inflation rate. The same would apply
if monetary policy continued to be expansionary but, at the same
time, inflation and the Dollar remained low. However, it would
not be a contradiction if US monetary policy became restrictive
and, consequently, the Dollar appreciated; in that case, a no-
ticeable acceleration of inflation could possibly be avoided.
...For a Forecast of the Exchange Rate...
We have not developed a scientific basis for exchange rate fore-
casts (2). In the short run, a forecast does not make sense any-
way if one believes in the random-walk nature of this relative
price (after all, shocks are defined to be unpredictable!). The
best forecast then is that the exchange rate will remain on its
present level (3) ; everything else would simply be speculation.
But our hypothesis seems to do well enough in explaining the
trend. Can this not be exploited for medium-run forecasts? This
can also be doubted because it is difficult, if not impossible,
to predict trends (or: the regime) of monetary policy; it may
(1) This rationality has recently been questioned by more and
more economists. Economic agents are often called ignorant
with respect to the so-called fundamentals. See, for example,
Marris [1985].
(2) It is strange to see that some economists think they have to
give up their job since they believe that they should be able
to make exchange rate forecasts but can't. However, not
having superior knowledge for each and every market is not a
failure of economics.
(3) A minor deviation is necessary if there is an interest rate
differential between the home and foreign currency.- 23 -
change any time. If, for example, the inflationary dangers were
seriously considered now in the US and if, because of that, the
Fed stepped on the brakes, a change in the trend of the Dollar
exchange rate would also be likely. In this case, the speculation
is about policy moves of the Fed. However, as experience shows,
predictions of this sort are very difficult; this is the dilemma
in a world in which the fine-tuning philosophy seems to dominate
and in which monetary policy is not geared to - or, at least,
does not stick to - medium-term targets. Thus we can possibly
only make conditional forecasts of the type: If US monetary poli-
cy remains expansionary even when inflation accelerates, the
Dollar is likely to remain weak.
...For the Discussion on the International Monetary System
There is a danger that inflation will also increase in West Ger-
many because the Bundesbank has more or less followed the expan-
sionary course of US monetary policy. Obviously, the German cen-
tral bank still pursues - explicitly or implicitly - an exchange
rate target (how else could the violation of the monetary target
in 1986 be explained?) . This behavior is the same as in the two
phases of the seventies when the Bundesbank tried to dampen the
revaluation of the DMark. Monetary expansion accelerated and
inflation went up - although by much less than in the US. This
risk also prevails today since monetary policy has been expansi-
onary for 15 months now.
In the international debate, the idea of target zones for ex-
change rates seems to become more and more attractive. The propo-
sal says that the governments should give "clear signals" to mar-
ket participants, who presumably neglect the so-called fundamen-
tals. As references for exchange rates, either current account
balances or the price levels of two respective countries are sug-
gested. But these reference paths do not make much sense because- 24 -
neither current account balances (1) nor purchasing power pari-
ties are reliable fundamentals for the exchange rate (2).
In the past, we have experienced sustained changes of real ex-
change rates. However, this fact does not at all reflect an irra-
tionality of markets; the opposite seems to be true since it was
argued that investors behave exactly the way we expect rational
agents to behave: They try to maximize their profits by using the
available information as good as they can. Of course, they will
make mistakes (3) . But they will probably try to avoid those
currencies which will depreciate relative to others. The return
to fixed exchange rates or - what is more or less the same - the
establishment of target zones cannot be successful. The Bretton
Woods system failed mainly because the industrial countries could
not agree on the same set of targets for economic policy. If
there is no such an agreement - and there is no reason to expect
this because it is quite natural to have different preferences in
different countries -, exchange rates must be flexible to adjust.
(1) The popular notion of overvalued or undervalued currencies
usually implies a certain value for the desirable or
"equilibrium" balance on current account (usually, it is
zero). This can be criticized for at least two reasons:
First, there is no reason why only a balanced current account
can be a sustainable equilibrium, since it is always
voluntarily financed. Second, terms like overvaluation imply
irrational behavior: It is claimed, for example, that in the
early eighties, investors made a mistake in buying US assets
when the Dollar went up because they should have known that
the Dollar was "too high"; in other words, they could have
easily avoided a tremendous capital loss if they had only
followed the calculations for the equilibrium value of the
Dollar based on a balanced current account.
(2) See also Scheide [1986a].
(3) For example, in an ex-post sense (but only in that sense) it
was wrong to invest money in the US at an exchange rate of DM
3.40 because later the Dollar dropped.- 25 -
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